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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
ATTORNEY GENERAL-RIGHTS AND DUTIES-WHETHER ATTORNEY GENERAL, WHERE HE Is ASSISTING STATE'S ATTORNEY, HAS ABSOLUTE RIGHT

TO NOLLE PROSEQUI THE CAsE--An issue with respect to the right of the
Attorney General to enter a motion for a nolle prosequi in a criminal proceeding was recently generated in the case of People ex rel. Castle v.
Daniels.' The grand jury had returned four indictments for embezzlement
against the defendant and the state's attorney, having previously made an
election to proceed on one of the four, was denied the right to proceed on
another. 2 The state's attorney thereupon moved to enter a nolle prosequi
as to the indictment originally chosen for prosecution, which motion was
denied by the court. Upon the request and with the consent of the state's
attorney, the Attorney General entered his appearance on behalf of the
People and moved unsuccessfully to nol-pros the same indictment. With
the state's attorney and the Attorney General both refusing to participate
further in the case, a jury was impanelled, a verdict of not guilty was
directed by the court, and judgment entered thereon. The Attorney General then requested leave of the Supreme Court of Illinois to file a petition
for an original writ of mandamus, 8 asking that the trial court be directed
to vacate its order denying the motion for a nolle prosequi, which petition
was granted. After a hearing, the Supreme Court awarded the writ of
mandamus, holding that the Attorney General was properly in the case
under the authority granted to him by statute4 and that he had the right
to nol-pros an indictment, if done before the jury was impanelled or before
trial of the case.
Prior decisions in
the Attorney General
pros a case where he is
The office of Attorney

Illinois indicate that it is well settled doctrine that
possesses a completely discretionary right to nolthe original and ordinary public prosecuting officer.
General was one which was known to the common

18 Ii. (2d) 43, 132 N. E. (2d) 507 (1956). Davis, J. wrote a dissenting opinion.
2 The state's attorney was apparently motivated by the belief that the state would
be unable to prove the charges contained In that particular Indictment. The trial
judge, however, insisted that the prosecution proceed according to Its prior election.
It may be noted that this order would not be appealable. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 747.
3 The authority for such action is contained in Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 2. See
also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 13.
4 fli. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, § 4, makes it the duty of the Attorney General "to consult with and advise the several state's attorneys in matters relating to
the duties of their office; and when, in his judgment, the Interest of the people of
the state requires it, he shall attend the trial of any party accused of crime, and
a88it in the prosecution". (Italics added.)
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law5 where he was the only law officer of the crown6 and, as such, the
power to nol-pros rested entirely within his discretion. 7 It has been held
that under common law principles the Attorney General had the duty of
intervening in litigation where public rights were threatened,8 that he may
give whatever assistance may be beneficial to the prosecution, 9 and that,
though acting in bad faith, he could dismiss a suit brought by the state. 0
In the case of Fergus v. Russell," it was held that, in making the Attorney
12
General a member of the Executive Department of the State of Illinois,'
the constitution conferred upon that office all of the common law powers
and duties possessed by the prosecuting officer of the crown, including the
absolute and unfettered discretion to enter such a motion. The Illinois
Supreme Court, in People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli,13 held that the Attorney
General had the absolute discretion to enter a nol-pros and that the
judiciary could not interfere with the exercise of this power as long as
his conduct was not capricious and vexatious. The argument was put forth
in the dissenting opinion that, since the state's attorney can nol-pros only
with the consent of the court, 14 the right of the Attorney General to nolpros a case should be likewise limited, at least where he is merely assisting
the state's attorney. However, the court considered the present case to be
controlled by the principles laid down in the Covelli decision notwithstanding the fact that the Attorney General was not the original and ordinary prosecuting officer.
The court, in the instant case, has extended the scope of the Attorney
General's power one step further in allowing him the right to enter a
nol-pros although not the original prosecuting officer. The present holding
serves to retain in the Attorney General that discretion vested in him at
common law, as well as to vindicate the apparent intention of the legislature when it defined his duties.' 5 It should be pointed out, however, that
5 Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600, 149 N. E. 526 (1925).
6 4 Reeves Hist. Eng. Law, Ch. 25, p. 122.
7 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 457, pp. 706-7.
s Hunt v. Chicago Horse & Dummy Ry. Co., 20 Ill. App. 282 (1887), reversed on
other grounds in 121 Ill. 638, 13 N. E. 176 (1887).
9 People v. Looney, 314 Ill. 150, 145 N. E. 365 (1924).
10 People v. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354, 192 N. E. 229 (1934).
11 270 Ill. 304, 110 N. E. 130 (1915). See also People v. Barrett, 382 Ill. 321, 46
N. E. (2d) 951 (1943) : Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600, 149 N. E. 526 (1925);
and Hunt v. Chicago Horse & Dummy Ry. Co., 20 Ill. App. 282 (1887).
12 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. V, § 1.
is 415 Ill. 79, 112 N. E. (2d) 156 (1953).
14 See People v. Newcomer, 284 Ill. 315. 120 N. E. 244 (1918).
15 See note 4, ante.
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the court did not purport to decide whether the Attorney General might
make an appearance and enter a motion to nol-pros against the wishes of
the state's attorney. One is also led to wonder whether, by this devise, a
way has been opened by which the state may secure review of the action
taken in a criminal case when resort to more direct methods would not be
available.16

COURTS-COURTS

or

LIMrrE

OR

INFERIOR

JURISDICTION-WHETHER

MONETARY LIMIT ON JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURT APPLIES IN CONFISCA-

TION PROCEEDINGS-An interesting question involving the jurisdictional

limits of county courts was recently presented to the Appellate Court for
the Second District of Illinois in the case of People v. 123 Punch Boards.1
Therein, the state's attorney filed a petition in the county court seeking to
have certain property, consisting of gaming devices and moneys whose
total value exceeded $2,000, declared contraband. Relying on the statute
which limits the jurisdiction of county courts to cases where the amount
claimed or the value of the property in controversy does not exceed $2,000,2
the owner of the property made appropriate jurisdictional objections, but
the county court nevertheless ordered part of the property destroyed and
the rest confiscated. The reviewing court affirmed the judgment when it
held that the county court had jurisdiction to order the destruction of
gaming devices and the confiscation of moneys used in gambling, irrespective of the amount in controversey, in accordance with the statute conferring upon any judge, justice or court the power to determine the contraband nature of gaming devices, and to order their destruction or other
disposition.3
While the precise factual situation presented in the instant action is
not entirely novel, the query presented appears to be the first of its kind
to be directly passed upon by a reviewing tribunal in Illinois. In the case
of People v. Moore,4 the total value of the property in question exceeded
$2,000, but no jurisdictional objection was raised. Therein, the Supreme
Court of Illinois apparently recognized the jurisdiction of the county
court in cases of this nature, by remanding the cause to the county court
to determine the contraband nature of the property in question. The ju16 The only appeal allowed the state in a criminal case is with respect to an
adverse ruling on a motion to quash the indictment. See I1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1,
Ch. 38, § 747.
111 Ill. App. (2d) 31, 135 N. E. (2d) 820 (1956).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 177.

s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, §§ 342 and 691-9.
4 410 Ill. 241, 102 N. E. (2d) 139 (1940).
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risdictional limit imposed by statute has been held inapplicable in analogous
situations, as in the case of City of Chicago v. Goebel,5 wherein it was held
that a county court had general jurisdiction to pass on the questions involved in a condemnation proceeding without regard to the amount involved. Similarly, in forcible entry and detainer proceedings, 6 commenced
before justices of the peace, Illinois reviewing courts have held that the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace 7 was not affected by the value of
the property involved since the gist of the action was the right to possession
and no sum or amount of money was directly involved. It is also interesting to note that no cases have been found in which the county court was
denied jurisdiction on account of the value of the property, though the
significance thereof is difficult to assess.
One might be led to conclude that the courts have based their decisions
on the rather tenuous argument that the monetary limitations on jurisdiction do not apply in those instances where the gist of the action is
merely to determine rights of ownership or possession in certain property,
and not the recovery of money damages. However, though the reviewing
courts have not so stated, it would appear that the more logical basis for
these decisions lies in the rule of statutory construction applicable where
two statutes are in pari materia.8 If this was, in fact, the basis of these
decisions, then the proceedings in the instant action, which are controlled
by a special statute,9 would be authorized as an exception to the jurisdic10
tional limitation imposed on the county court by the general statute.
The instant case can be thus harmonized with accepted principles of law
and there is every reason to believe that decisions of the type reflected in
the subject case should be upheld by the reviewing courts of the state.
5301 Ill. App. 73, 21 N. E. (2d) 844 (1939). That suit was instituted under Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 24, § 738, which states that "the several Circuit, County and
City Courts of this State . . . shall have jurisdiction of any proceedings under
this Act." The act was subsequently revised, so that the controlling statute is
now to be found in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 84-37, which contains
essentially the same language.
6 Schumann Piano Co. v. Mark, 208 Ill. 282, 70 N. E. 226 (1904); Hannigan v.
Mossler, 44 Ill. App. 117 (1892). Jurisdiction over such proceedings is conferred by
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 5.

7 Jurisdiction of justices of the peace is limited to cases where the amount in
controversy does not exceed $500. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 79, § 16.
8 The rule is, "where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and
another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two
should be harmonized if possible, but if there is any conflict, the latter will
prevail." Sutherland, Statutory Construction, (3rd Ed.), Vol. II, § 5204.

9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, §§ 342 and 691-9.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 177.
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COUNTERCLAIMS

FOR PERSONAL

INJURIES-A further question concerning the jurisdiction of county courts
has been decided in the recent case of Poole v. Lake,' where the reviewing
court was called upon, for the first time, to decide if county courts have
jurisdiction over counterclaims for personal injuries in other than trespass
situations. Following an automobile accident, the plaintiff brought suit in
a county court to recover for damages to his property and the defendants
filed a counterclaim for redress of personal injuries. The plaintiff's motion
to dismiss the counterclaim was granted and judgment entered against the
counterclaimants. On review, the Appellate Court for the First District
of Illinois reversed the decision and remanded the case after concluding
that the statutory jurisdiction of county courts was broad enough to com2
prehend such actions.
A previous statute, last amended in 1939, conferred jurisdiction on
county courts concurrent with the circuit court in all of those cases wherein
justices of the peace now have or may hereafter have jurisdiction.3 At
that time, the statute delineating the actions that justices of the peace
4
might hear and determine made no mention of cases involving negligence.
The literal import of these two statutes would not permit county courts to
entertain cases involving negligence and this construction was confirmed by
the Appellate Court for the Fourth District of Illinois when it held, in
5
the case of City of Robinson v. Hilderbrand,
that a county court had no
jurisdiction in cases claiming compensation for negligently caused personal injuries. The Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois had
also adopted the view that county courts have no jurisdiction in cases
where the complaint was predicated on a negligent tort.'
Thereafter, in 1943, the General Assembly, by amendment, granted
justices of the peace jurisdiction over cases involving trespass and trespass
on the case, 7 which would include causes predicated upon negligence.
One might here consider the question of whether this amendment would
affect county courts at all since it was passed long after the statute defining the jurisdiction of county courts and contains no express reference
to that court. However, this problem is resolved because the older statute
1 11 Il.

App. (2d)

220, 136 N. E.

(2d)

539 (1956).

2 I1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 79, § 16.
3 I1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, §177.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 79, § 16.
5 71 Ill. App. 53 (1897).
6 Schiller v. Nevius, 187 Ill. App. 485 (1913), abst. opin.
7 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 79, § 16.
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confers jurisdiction on county courts where justices of the peace have
or may hereafter have jurisdiction.
Inasmuch as justices of the peace had jurisdiction over certain specified actions resting on charges of negligence prior to the 1943 amendment,
the appellee took the position that the addition of language granting
jurisdiction in cases of trespass on the case comprehended only those
He further
negligence actions that had been theretofore included."
might
consequences
out
that
absurd
by
pointing
bulwarked this argument
9
of
the
that
justices
in
of
the
amendment
follow a literal construction
benefit
actions
without
peace would then be able to hear complicated
of written pleadings, and that such officials need not be and often are
not lawyers. In response to the first argument, it may be said that the
court was unwilling to conclude that the legislature intended to accomplish nothing by the amendment. With respect to the second, it was
pointed out that the jurisdiction of justices of the peace is limited to
cases in which the amount claimed does not exceed five hundred dollars 0
and, therefore, it is unlikely that any complicated actions will be brought
involving such a small amount. It is also to be noted that no judges in
the state courts of Illinois need be lawyers."
One might be led to conclude that the court properly found the
legislative intent inasmuch as county courts are usually accorded higher
regard than justices of the peace and to deny the former jurisdiction
given the latter would be inconsistent with the general arrangement of
the courts. The instant case, although it makes no positive statements
to that effect, indicates that it would now be proper to institute suits for
personal injuries in county courts and thus, in some instances, provide
an avenue of escape from the congested dockets of the courts of general
jurisdiction. This case should, therefore, receive the plaudits of lawyers
and the general public alike for the manner in which it partially alleviates
a problem which in some areas has become acute.
5 The appellee contended that the rule of ejusdem generis applied, and that the
words of the amendment were meant to apply only to the previously enumerated
actions and, therefore, it was not meant to grant jurisdiction to these courts in
cases involving negligently caused personal injuries. For a statement of this rule of
construction, see 28 C. J. S. 1049.
9 It is often stated that a construction of a statute which leads to absurd consequences should be avoided. See, for example, Moweaqua Coal Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, 360 Ill. 194, 195 N. E. 607 (1935) ; People v. Hughes, 357 Ill. 524, 192
N. E. 551 (1934) ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Industrial Board, 282 fl. 136, 118 N. E.
483 (1917).
1o Il. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 79, § 16.
11Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, §§ 3 and 17. These two sections give the qualifications
for judges in the Supreme Court and inferior state courts, but they are silent as to
the necessity of being a lawyer.
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EMBEZZLEMENT-EMBEZZLEMENT

BY PARTICULAR CLASSES OF PEOPLE-

WHETHER A COLLECTION AGENT WITH THE RIGHT TO DEDUCT COMMISSIONS

FROM AMOUNTS COLLECTED MAY BE CONVICTED OF EMBEZZLEMENT--In the

recent Illinois case of People v. Riggins,' the Supreme Court of Illinois was
faced with the necessity of deciding whether or not a professional collection agent, who claimed an interest in the monies collected, could be
convicted of embezzlement under the existing statutes. The record in
that case showed that the defendant had been engaged by the complaining witness, a storekeeper, to collect her delinquent accounts. The agreement provided that the defendant need not account for partial payments
until the debt was collected in full, at which time he was to deduct the
amount of his commission and remit the remainder to the complaining
witness. When the storekeeper learned that the defendant had withheld
certain sums due and owing to her under their agreement, she preferred
the charges against him which resulted in his indictment and conviction
for embezzlement. On a direct appeal, 2 the Supreme Court, though it
reversed and remanded on other grounds, concluded that the defendant

was an "agent" within the purview of a special embezzlement statute
which declared that an agent might be convicted of embezzlement whether
or not he had or claimed to have any rights in such money.3
The principal argument offered by the defendant rested on earlier
Illinois decisions which approved of the doctrine that a collecting agent,

who followed an independent business and who had the right to commingle
funds, could not be convicted as an "agent"

under a general embezzle-

ment statute4 since he had a joint interest in the property said to be
embezzled. 5 The Illinois court traced briefly the historical basis underlying this contention, but used very conclusive language in pointing out

that since 1919 this doctrine had been expressly abrogated in Illinois
by the special statute. 6 In reply to the defendant's insistent argument
that he at no time acted as an "agent" for the complaining witness within
the meaning of the special statute, the court, relying on previous Illinois
18 II. (2d) 78, 132 N. E. (2d) 519 (1956). Schaefer, J. wrote a dissenting
opinion concurred in by Maxwell and Klingbeil, JJ.
2 A direct appeal to the Supreme Court is authorized by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 780'A.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 210.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 208.
5 This contention has been upheld in the following cases in Illinois; People v.
Ervin, 342 Il1. 421, 174 N. E. 529 (1930); People v. Dettmering, 178 I1. 580, 116
N. E. 205 (1917) ; and City Trust, Safe Deposit & Surety Co. v. Lee, 107 IH. App.
263, affirmed in 204 Il.69, 68 N. E.485 (1903). Also see 17 Ill. Law & Prac., Embezzlement, § 6, p. 161.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 210.
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decisions and several encyclopedic sources, 7 proceeded to spell out the
interpretation to be accorded this term. They concluded that the term
''agent", as used in embezzlement statutes, is to be construed in its popular sense, namely, a person who undertakes to transact some business for
another under the latter's authority and to render an account of such
business while acting in a fiduciary capacity since, in Illinois as in other
jurisdictions, the relationship of principal and agent is a fiduciary one. s The
court also stated that one acts in a fiduciary capacity where special confidence is reposed in a person who is bound in equity and good conscience
to act in good faith with due regard to the interest of the person reposing
said confidence. 9 In analyzing the defendant's duties to the storekeeper,
the court pointed out that he had no right to collect from anyone other
than those authorized by her and, by assuming this relationship, he undertook the duty to exercise good faith and make a full disclosure while
acting in a fiduciary capacity. It followed then that the defendant was
an "agent" of the complaining witness and, therefore, within the purview
of the special embezzlement statute of 1919.
The decision in this case appears to be both sound and reasonable,
notwithstanding the dissenting opinion which felt that the term "agent",
since used in a criminal statute, should be strictly construed and was,
therefore, merely reiterative of other general classifications of agents
therein included. 10 But if the latter construction had been placed on the
statute, there would have been no change in the older doctrine of the
law of embezzlement as applied to agents, and no apparent reason for
including the term "agent" in the newer statute, an intention which could
not logically be ascribed to the legislature.
7 The fiduciary relationship between principal and agent is defined and applied
in Hickey v. Hickey, 371 Ill. 476, 21 N. E. (2d) 579 (1939) where the court said,
"an agent is a 'fiduciary' with respect to matters within the scope of the agency
and is bound to act solely for the principal in matters connected with that agency."
For other cases which define this relationship, see Blanchard v. Lewis, 414 Il.
515, 112 N. E. (2d) 167 (1953) ; People v. Henderson, 378 Ill. 436. 21 N. E. (2d)
727 (1942) ; Bourjaily v. Masek, 351 Ill. App. 109, 113 N. E. (2d) 577 (1953). See
also, 18 Am. Jur., Embezzlement, § 30, pp. 587-8: and 17 Ill. Law & Prac., Embezzlement, § 3, p. 159.

8 Hickey v. Hickey, 371 Il1. 476, 21 N. E.

(2d) 579 (1939).

9 Wharton v. Myers, 371 Ill. 546, 21 N. E. (2d)

772 (1939).

10 The degree of conformity to "strictness" which the dissenting opinion in this

case sought to impose has overtones which would be inherently dangerous to the
intelligent functions of judicial interpretation. The general feeling of our courts
in this matter was aptly summarized by Justice Holmes when he once said, "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit,
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying
what they obviously mean." Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337 at 339, 49 S. Ct. 336
at 336, 73 L. Ed. 722 at 728.

RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS

LANDLORD AND TENANT-PREMISES, AND ENJOYMENT AND USE THERFOF--WHETHER OR NOT A LANDLORD IS LIABLE TO TENANT'S GUEST, PRESENT
FOR AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE, FOR DEFECTIVE CONDITION OF PREMisEs-The

counsel for the defendant, in the recent case of Shiroma v. Itano,' exhibited imagination and ingenuity in presenting a unique defense to an
action against his client for redress of an injury sustained by an invitee
of the defendant's tenant. The plaintiff, having come upon the premises
at the invitation of a tenant to play poker for nominal stakes, sustained
injury by falling down an unlighted stairway under the control of the
defendant. In the course of the proceedings, the defendant's counsel
interposed the defense that his client owed no duty to the plaintiff to
keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition because the plaintiff was
on the premises for an unlawful purpose. For reasons not entirely clear,
the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant 2 but, on appeal, the
Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois reversed and remanded,
holding that the landlord's customary duty to a guest of his tenant is
not extinguished simply because the guest is present for an unlawful
purpose.
The crucial question which faced the court was whether the landlord owed any duty to one who comes upon the premises for an unlawful
purpose. It has often been said that the duty of a landlord to maintain
the premises in a reasonably safe condition extends to persons lawfully
on the premises. 3 However, with respect to guests of a tenant, it seems
to have heretofore been an open question as to whether the qualification,
lawfully on the premises, referred to the injured party's relationship
to the tenant or to the motive for his presence. By way of background,
it may be said initially that the landlord's duty to maintain that portion
of the premises used in common by all tenants rests upon the proposition that, since he is in control thereof, he is the only person who has
the right to govern their physical condition. 4 The duty is extended to
the guests of a tenant on the theory that, by renting to the tenant, the
110 I1. App. (2d) 428, 135 N. E. (2d)

123 (1956).

2 In the course of its opinion, the court stated, "Neither defendant's request for
a directed verdict nor the peremptory instruction of the court indicated in what
particular the plaintiff had failed o prove his cause of action."
3 See Murphy v. Illinois State Trust Co., 375 Ill. 310, 31 N. E. (2d) 305 (1941);
Kopta v. Greer Shop Training, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 470, 64 N. E. (2d) 570 (1946);
Hart v. Sullivan, 324 Ill. App. 243, 58 N. E. (2d) 301 (1944) ; and 32 Am. Jur.,
Landlord And Tenant, § 691, p. 568.
4 See B. Shoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill. 242, 76 N. E. 354 (1905); Burke v.
Hulett, 216 Ill. 545, 75 N. E. 240 (1905) ; Payne v. Irvin, 144 Ill. 482, 33 N. E. 756
(1893) ; Murphy v. Brickler, 305 Ill. App. 6 (1940) ; Glassman v. Abromovich, 163
Ill. App. 388 (1911).
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landlord has impliedly extended an invitation to those persons to come
upon the premises and he should, therefore, keep them in a reasonably safe
condition for their benefit. 5
The court, in the instant case, thought it useful to refer to conventional tort cases charging negligence wherein the plaintiff had been engaging in conduct in violation of the law at the time of his injury. 6 But
in each of these cases, the unlawful act of the plaintiff was raised to
sustain a charge of contributory negligence. And in each, it was decided
that the unlawful act of the plaintiff would affect his right of recovery
only if it had in some way contributed to his injury, a result which is
certainly consistent with the theory of contributory negligence. But it
should be pointed out that the existence of a duty toward the plaintiff,
the critical question in the instant case, was not there in issue. It seems
highly tenuous, therefore, to say that the impact there given the plaintiff's unlawful conduct should be decisive of the present problem.
In another line of cases, the Illinois courts appear to have made use
of a second approach to the problem presented where the plaintiff has
been guilty of unlawful conduct. Thereunder, persons injured while
voluntarily participating in the commission of criminal acts have been
denied recovery on the theory that the courts ought not grant relief
to wrongdoers. Thus, the personal representative of a person who submitted to a criminal abortion has been refused relief,7 and a like fate has
been visited upon a plaintiff injured while participating in an unlawful
"charivari" party.8 However, these cases are also distinguishable from
the main case under discussion in that they were decided on the theory
that the plaintiff was persona non grata; the existence of a duty toward
the plaintiff was again not questioned. It might also be noted that, in
the instant case, the injury occurred during an interlude in the unlawful activity, so it can also be distinguished on that basis.
With no Illinois precedents to guide them, the court must, of necessity, arrive at a decision by the logical extension of existing theories of
liability. If it be true, as heretofore indicated, 9 that the landlord's duty
to the guests of his tenant exists at all on the theory that he has impliedly
5 Hart v. Sullivan, 324 Il1. App. 243, 58 N. E. (2d) 301 (1944) ; Fisher v. Jansen
30 I1. App. 91 (1881).
6 For example, see Newton v. Illinois Oil Co., 316 Ill. 416, 147 N. E. 465 (1925);
Jeneary v. C. & J. Traction Co., 306 11. 392, 138 N. E. 203 (1923) ; and Lerette v.
Director General of Railroads, 306 II. 348, 137 N. E. 811 (1922).
7 Castronovo v. Murawsky, 3 Ill. App. (2d) 168, 120 N. E. (2d) 871 (1954),
noted in 33 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REviEw 180.
8 Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 130, 65 N. E. 84 (1902).

9 See note 5, ante.
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invited them to come upon the premises, it seems to place a strain on that
implication to say that they were invited to participate in an unlawful
activity. On that basis, to reach the result achieved in the instant case,
one must impute the intention to aid and abet the commission of crimes.
Certainly, a contrary intention on the part of the landlord would appear
to be more consistent with reality. 10 It is submitted, therefore, that the
instant case should not be followed unless that result will serve some
social policy not apparent in that case.
PARENT AND

PROMISE To

CHILD-SUPPORT AND

EDUCATION OF CHILD-WEIETHER

ADOPT CHILD AND RELIEVE PARENT

OF

BURDEN OF SUPPORT IS

NoT -- An interesting
question involving the validity of provision in a contract for the adoption
of a child was presented to the Appellate Court of Illinois for the First
District through the medium of the recent case entitled Wiley v. Lawton.1
The plaintiffs therein were the former wife of the defendant and her
second husband. Under an earlier divorce decree, the defendant had
been directed to contribute a stated weekly sum toward the support of
a minor child but he had fallen into arrears on these support payments.
The plaintiffs offered, for a stated consideration, to legally adopt the child
and relieve the defendant of any further obligation to contribute toward
its support. Defendant so agreed, paid part of the agreed sum, and gave
a note for the balance. Following upon a default under the terms of this
note, the plaintiffs took judgment by confession. The defendant moved
to vacate this judgment on the ground the contract and the note were
against public policy and void. This motion was denied by the trial
court but, on defendant's appeal, the ruling was reversed and the trial
court was directed to grant the motion and vacate the judgment.
VALID

CONSIDERATION

FOR

PARENT'S

PROMISSORY

The case would appear to be the first one in this state which has
dealt with the liability of a natural parent under a contract for the
adoption of his child by third parties. Prior to this, it had been held
that an agreement to adopt, whether written or oral, would be enforceable, 2 at least at the instance of the child, provided it was made by parties
competent to contract, was based upon a sufficient consideration, and
was not contrary to public policy.3 In order to determine whether the
contract itself would be against public policy, it would be necessary to
10 See Nichols Annotated Forms (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1945), 2d Ed., § 1557,
p. 574, for a sample form of lease containing an agreement to comply with all laws
presently, or thereafter, in effect.
18 II. App. (2d) 344, 132 N. E. (2d) 34 (1956).
2 Soelzer v. Soelzer, 382 fli. 393, 47 N. E. (2d) 458 (1943).
3 Winkelmann v. Winkelmann, 345 Il1. 566, 178 N. E. 118 (1931).
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look to the contract itself4 and to determine the effect it would have upon
the public in general. Contracts which would tend to disrupt natural
family relationships, such as agreements designed to promote divorce,
have been said to be opposed to public policy 5 and void 6 and, in much the
same way, contracts made between a husband and a wife intended to
relieve the husband of his legal obligation to support his wife would also
fall under the same ban.7
It would seem, therefore, that if a husband is not to be permitted
to relieve- himself, by contract, of his obligation to support his wife, a
parent should be equally incapable of discharging his duty toward his
child in a similar way. This is not to say that every agreement looking
toward an adoption should be treated as being void s but certainly no promise, in whatever form, designed as a means whereby to purchase a discharge of the natural parent's non-delegable, non-releasable duty to support 9 should be considered enforceable in law. 10
TELECOMMUNICATIONs-TELEPHONE SERVICF-WHETHER A TELEPHONE
COMPANY RETAINS A PROPERTY RIGHT IN DIRECTORIES ISSUED TO ITS SUB-

SCRIBERs-The reviewing courts of Illinois in the recent case of Illinois
Bell Telephone Company v. Miner,1 were, for the first time, called upon to
determine if a telephone company retains any property rights in directories issued to its subscribers. The defendant therein had been distribut4

Ostrowsky v. Berg, 337 11. App. 422, 86 N. H. (2d) 546 (1949).

Floberg v. Floberg, 358 IIl. 626, 193 N. E. 456 (1935) ; Morrissey v. Morrissey,
299 Ill. App. 173, 19 N. E. (2d) 835 (1939) : Lehmann v. Lehmann, 225 Ill. App.
513 (1922).
6 Colgrove v. Lowe, 343 Ill. 360, 175 N. E. 569 (1931) : Smith v. Rust. 310 Ill.
App. 47, 33 N. E. (2d) 723 (1941).
7 In re Moser. 145 F. (2d) 623 (1944).
But see the later case of Laleman v.
Crombez, 6 Ill. (2d) 194, 127 N. E. (2d) 489 (1955), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KENT
5
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185.

8 Specific provision is made, in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 3-3 to 3-8,
for the use of written consents to adoption to be given by persons there enumerated. In connection therewith, see People ex rel. Nabstedt v. Barger, 3 Ill. (2d)
511, 121 N. E. (2d) 781 (1954), noted in 33 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEW 249.
9 Not even an adoption will serve to relieve the natural parent of the obligation
to support his child; Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630, 10 N. E. (2d) 344 (1937).
10A different, though not necessarily Inconsistent, result was reached in the
recently published Ohio decision of McCrann v. McCrann,-Ohio App.-, 138 N. E.
(2d) 169 (1951), wherein a divorced wife sued her former husband to recover
delinquent child support payments. Therein, an agreement in which the second
husband of the wife undertook to support the children in return for the first
husband's promise not to attempt to see them was sustained. However, support
during the period of delinquency had actually been rendered by the second husband
so that no burden was cast upon the public. The court had no occasion to consider
the effect of this agreement on the first husband's future obligation to support the
children.
111 Ill. App. (2d) 44, 136 N. E. (2d) 1 (1956).
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ing plastic covers bearing advertising matter and emergency phone numbers to various customers of the plaintiff and urging them to place these
covers over the directories. In a suit to enjoin this practice, the circuit
court dismissed the complaint. On review, the Appellate Court for the
Second District of Illinois, in reversing the judgment, held that the plaintiff retained the ownership and constructive possession of the directories
and that the distribution of these plastic covers constituted a tortious interference with the contracts between the plaintiff and its subscribers.
Faced with a novel factual situation, the court pointed out that the
plaintiff is required to file a schedule or tariff with the Illinois Commerce
Commission 2 containing a statement of all rules, regulations, and rates
charged for any service,3 and that the schedule or tariff so filed embodies
the contract between the plaintiff and its subscribers.4 This contract
provides that directories are the property of the telephone company,
loaned to subscribers only as an aid to the telephone service, are to
be returned on request, and that subscribers shall not permit the attachment of advertising devices to equipment or facilities furnished by the
company.
It would follow then that the relationship between the plaintiff and
its subscribers is that of bailor and bailee. The law is well settled in
Illinois that a bailor at will retains title and constructive possession of the
bailed property 5 and has a right to maintain an action for trespass thereto
against third persons. 6 Inasmuch as injunctive relief is proper in a case
involving continuing and repeated acts of trespass, 7 the action of the
reviewing court is not surprising.
The placing of plastic covers over directories is a violation of the
subscriber's contract with the plaintiff which forbids the attachment of
advertising devices to the equipment or facilities furnished by the company. This breach of contract occurred as a result of the defendant's
inducements and provides the plaintiff with a basis to complain of an
unlawful interference with the contract. This cause of action proceeds
on the theory that the right to reap the profit from the performance of
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Cb. 111 2/3,

§ 35.

3 Ibid., Cb. 111 2/3, § 33.

Rager v. Western Union Telegraph, 313 Ill. App. 589, 40 N. E. (2d) 606 (1942).
II. 336. 31 N. E. (2d) 585 (1941) : People v. Robinson. 352
Ill. 596, 186 N. E. 484 (1933) ; People v. Gualano, 349 Ill. 235, 181 N. E. 643 (1932).
6 Scott v. Bryson. 74 Ill. 420 (1874) ; Miller v. Kirby, 74 Ill. 242 (1874) ; Dean v.
Comstock 32 Ill. 173 (1863).
4

5 People v. Moses. 375

7 McIntyre v. McIntyre, 287 Ill. 544, 122 N. E. 824 (1919) ; Craig v. Levinson, 238
Ill. 69. 87 N. E. 121 (1909); Scbolz v. Barbee, 344 Ill. App. 630, 101 N. E. (2d)
845 (1951).
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a contract is a recognized property right entitled to protection by an
action in tort s as well as by injunction.9 The fact that defendant acted
without malice and sought only to further his own interests is not a defense to such an action 0 because malice, as that term is commonly used,
is not an element of the action, but in this connection denotes any unjustified interference with the contractual relation."
In holding as it did, the appellate court has adopted a view consistent
with decisions of the federal courts to the effect that a directory is an
essential feature of the telephone service 12 and that a telephone company
simply lends equipment to subscribers and does not make a sale or lease
thereof.18 It would also appear that the result achieved in the principal
case is sound in that the plaintiff's alternatives are to either suspend
service to the subscribers involved or to tolerate the interference. The
former entails a loss of revenue to the utility and the loss of service to
the public; the latter involves a pro tanto loss of the right of contract
and the right of property, neither of which should be imposed on the
4
plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EFFECT Or
COMMON LAW RIGHTS OP ACTION AND

ACT

ON OTHER STATUTORY OR

DEFENSES-WHETHER

EMPLOYEE

COVERED BY WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT IS BARRED FROM MAINTAINING
COMMON LAW ACTION TO RECOVER FOR INJURIES NOT COMPENSABLE UNDER

THE AcT-The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of Moushon v. National Garages, Inc.,' was faced with the problem of determining the employee's right to maintain a common law action against his employer in
instances where the injury complained of was suffered while the employee
was engaged in the scope of his employment. The plaintiff therein was
injured when a safety device on the "man lift" which he was riding failed,
causing the loss of the plaintiff's testicles and rendering him impotent.
8 Bloom v. Bohemians, 233 Ill. App. 269 (1921).
9 Carpenter's Union v. Citizens Committee, 333 Ill. 225, 164 N. E. 393 (1928);
Messenger Publishing Co. v. Mokstad, 257 Ill. App. 161 (1930) ; Mahler v. Sancho,
121 Ill. App. 252 (1905), reversed on other grounds in 233 Ill. 225, 79 N. E. 9

(1906).

10 Carpenter's Union v. Citizens Committee, 333 Ill. 225, 164 N. E. 393 (1928).

11 London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N. E. 526 (1906).
12 McTighe v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 216 F. (2d) 26 (1954).
13 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Dialite Co., 102 F. Supp. 872 (1951).
14 It may be noted that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has very
recently reached a contrary result in New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. National
Merch. Corp., - Mass. -, 141 N. E. (2d) 702 (1957).
19 Ii1. (2d) 407, 137 N. E. (2d) 842 (1956). Bristow, J. wrote a dissenting
opinion.
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While admitting that he was covered by the Act, the plaintiff contended
that, since the compensation awarded is only for the loss of his testicles, 2
his common law action for redress of other injuries, namely, impotency
and pain and suffering, should not be barred. The lower court sustained
the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was
barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act.3 On appeal, 4 the Supreme
Court held that an employee who is covered by the provisions of the
Act is restricted to the compensation provided under the Act and is precluded from maintaining a common law action against his employer even
though the particular injury suffered was not compensable under the
Worknen's Compensation Act.
The intriguing problem presented in the instant case is one of utmost
importance and has been closely followed by employers as well as insurance
companies throughout the United States. 5 For if the plaintiff had prevailed in this action, the employer would have been subjected to an additional liability not heretofore recognized since the passage of the Workmen's Compensation Act. While Illinois courts have determined that
the Workmen's Compensation Act precludes the employee from maintaining a common law action against the employer in those cases where
compensation is provided under the Act, 6 no precedent has been found
involving the precise question as to whether the Workmen's Compensation Act bars a common law action for all injuries which are "accidental"
within the meaning of the Act and which are occasioned while in the
course of employment, without regard to the nature of the injuries, or
whether they are compensable or non-compensable under the terms of
the Act.
See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, §§138.8(a), 138.8(b), and 138.8(e) (15).
8111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5(a) reads in part as follows: "No
common law or statutory right to recover damages for injury or death sustained
by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other
than the compensation herein provided, shall be available to any employee who is
covered by the provisions of this act, ... "
4 The plaintiff, standing on his complaint, appealed directly to the Supreme Court
of fllinois on the ground that a constitutional question was involved, a procedure
authorized by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199(1).
5 The wave of excitement was created by the first opinion of the Supreme Court
of Illinois, filed in the March Term, 1956, which reversed the judgment of the
circuit court.
6 O'Brien v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 305 ll. 244, 137 N. E. 214 (1922) ; Hayes v.
Marshall Field & Co., 351 I1. App. 329, 115 N. E. (2d) 99 (1953) ; Will v. 1527-31
Wicker Park Ave. Bldg. Corp., 324 Ill. App. 264, 58 N. E. (2d) 296 (1944) ; Green
v. Walgreen Co., 317 Ill. App. 148, 45 N. E. (2d) (1942) ; Wilson Garment Mfg. Co.
v. Edmonds, 312 Ill. App. 317, 38 N. E. (2d) 534 (1941) ; Schnell v. National Air
Transport, 296 Ill. App. 641, 16 N. E. (2d) 191 (1938), abst. opin.; Wright v.
Peabody Coal Co., 290 Ill. App. 110, 8 N. E. (2d) 68 (1937) ; Lavigne v. Chicago,
M., St. P., & P. Ry. Co., 287 Ill. App. 253, 4 N. E. (2d) 785 (1936) ; Moy Wang v.
Whelan, 284 Ill. App. 653, 2 N. H. (2d) 337 (1936) ; Brennen Const. Co. v. Blair,
261 Ill. App. 9 (1931) ; Rogers v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co., 210 Ill. App. 577 (1918).
2
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In the instant case, the majority of the court took the position that
the Workmen's Compensation Act is a complete substitute remedy for
common law actions where the employer and employee are operating within
the scope of the Act when the injury occurs. The court adopted the
language found in the case of M. & H. Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board7 in
speaking of the legislative purpose of the Act. In that case, the court
said, "It is therefore clear that the words 'accident' and 'accidental injury', used in the Act were meant to include every injury suffered in the
course of employment for which there was an existing right of action at
the time the Act was passed; also to extend the liability of the employer
to make compensation for injuries for which he was not previously liable
and to limit such compensation. '"8 At least one text writer appears to
have adopted a like interpretation of Workmen's Compensation Act provisions which bar common law actions. 9 It might also be noted that in
Lavigne v. Chicago, M., St. P., & P. Ry. Co. 10 the court held the Workmen's Compensation Act to be an exclusive remedy for a railroad switchman seeking damages for breach of a duty imposed by the Federal Safety
While the precise question involved in the instant
Compliance Act."
case was not presented in the Lavigne case, the court's exposition of
the term "exclusive remedy" could very well be extended to cover those
situations where the employee seeks to recover for injuries not compensable
under the Act.
The fundamental problem, as revealed by a vigorous dissenting opinion, is whether the legislature intended to abolish common law remedies
where no adequate substitution is provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act and, of course, denies the existence of any such intention. While
numerous cases are cited to substantiate this position, a careful analysis
of these precedents indicates that they can be distinguished on the ground
that the Act 12 did not apply since the employee was not engaged in the
scope of his employment,' 3 or the harm complained of was not an accidental
7 284 Ill. 378, 120 N. E. 249. This case must be distinguished, since the claimant
could receive compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act once the court
determined the cause of death was an accidental injury within the purview of the
act.
8 284 Ill. 378 at 383, 120 N. E. 249 at 251.
9 Angerstein, Illinois Workmen's Compensation (Burdette Smith Company, Chicago, 1952), Vol. 1, pp. 19-20.
10 287 Ill. App. 253, 4 N. E. (2d) 785 (1936). Cert. den., 302 U. S.688, 58 S. Ct.
32, 82 L. Ed. 532 (1937).
11 For cases in other jurisdictions holding the Workmen's Compensation Act to
be an exclusive remedy, see 100 A. L. R. 519, 121 A. L. R. 1143.
12 Annotations of the cases relied upon can be found at 100 A. L. R. 519, and 121
A. L. R. 1143.
13 For example, see Thomas v. Shippers Compress & Warehouse Co., - La. App.
-, 158 So. 859 (1935).
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injury within the meaning of the Act. 1 4 About the best that can be said
for the dissenter's position is that the remedy provided by the legislature
is not adequate in all instances where the employee is accidentally injured
while engaged in the scope of his employment. However unfortunate
it may be that such employee is left uncompensated with a permanent
injury, it is not the court's function to provide an adequate remedy
where the legislature has failed to do so, and the court must construe the
law to express the legislature's intention. 15
The statutory interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act
in this case seems logical and unequivocal. The statute is clear and unambiguous in its language when it bars the employee from maintaining
a common law action against his employer in those instances where he
is harmed while engaged in the scope of his employment and the harm
complained of is an injury within the meaning of the Act. One could
not very well expect a result different from that attained.

Typical of these cases is McGehee v. Mepham & Co., 279 Ill. App. 115 (1935).
Com., 373 Il. 468, 26 N. E. (2d) 510
(1940).
14

15 New National Coal Co. v. Industrial

